Chairman, delegates

As a scientist, it gives me particular pleasure to address this important forum, whose purpose is to serve the interests not of any nation, but of all humanity. Serving humanity is also the loftiest aim of science, and particularly of the life sciences in which I'm trained.

My comments are those of a "concerned scientist", involved in efforts to prevent the development or spread of biological weapons: weapons, we should be clear, that are capable of causing casualties equivalent to those of nuclear weapons. I share the concerns expressed in the ICRC appeal on 'Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity', and welcome the ICRC's initiative to address practical issues of prevention of hostile use. However arcane such topics may sound at face value, preventing poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease is already of fundamental importance to humanity's future in the 21st century, whether we acknowledge it or not.

My remarks over the next few minutes will be in support of 3 essential points:

1. Advances in the life sciences mean that the potential for their use for hostile purposes is increasing, despite this being banned under international law.

2. I will explain why it's vital that actors in the life sciences fulfill their legal and ethical responsibilities to ensure prevention of hostile use. If necessary, individual preventive actions and their interaction need to be viewed in new ways. The ICRC describes this as the 'web of prevention'.

3. In order to prevent poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease it's imperative that governments, National Societies and the other components of the Movement take action of the types proposed in the ICRC appeal through their political support and practical action.

The revolution in biotechnology could benefit humanity in countless ways. New vaccines, new cures for diseases and improved nutrition, for instance, may profoundly improve our lives as well as those of future generations.

Indeed, biotechnology's world-changing effects won't be a vision of the future much longer: its products are appearing on shop shelves and in pharmacies now. Biotechnology is becoming cheaper, and knowledge of it more widespread. The place that the life sciences occupy in society is widening.

Conversely, advances in the life sciences used for hostile ends could be devastating to humanity. This danger is real. As someone trained in biology and the neurosciences I'm constantly reminded of the fragility of the human mind and body. There are myriad sources of danger to this delicately balanced organism, and to the biological survival of our species as a whole. Many of the dangers we recognise are viewed as such precisely because insights in the modern natural sciences – biology, chemistry, genomics, bioinformatics and many other disciplines – have provided an understanding of the building blocks of life.

These same disciplines increasingly bestow the capacity to manipulate basic life processes such as metabolism, breathing, reproduction and cognition. Information from governments, United Nations agencies, scientific and medical circles and industry provides a disturbingly long list of existing and emerging capabilities for the misuse of scientific advances. The stark future we face is that, if the history of science and the past development of weapons are any guide, these new advances will make the development of biological weapons more attractive to those with hostile intent. And, it will in all likelihood make such hostile use far more effective, while more difficult to detect.

I would emphasise the point that new technologies developed even with the best of intentions may be subverted by the unscrupulous or ignorant for hostile use, if not properly controlled. Recombinant splicing of new DNA into mousepox by Australian researchers is not in itself a hostile use of the life sciences. But knowledge about the great increase in lethality of the modified disease that resulted could potentially be misused in order to make new human diseases in the future based on smallpox, tularemia or plague, for instance. Likewise, the synthetic reconstruction of poliovirus in an American laboratory reported last year, using a recipe available on the Internet and materials purchased from a mail-order company, was not intended for hostile use. But it points the way for those with hostile intent if preventive measures are not in place.

Unlike nuclear or chemical weapons, the development or production of a biological weapon doesn't need a lot of visible infrastructure. A great deal of technology and knowledge in the life sciences is inherently 'dual-use', and is available in facilities across the globe, a trend which will only continue.

It's worth pointing out at this point that the culprits of a future biological weapons attack may not be terrorists, despite current preoccupations. A recent BBC news article reported that while at least a few virus-writing computer hackers are genuinely malicious, psychological profiling shows the majority are simply curious, or unaware of the potential consequences of their actions. Eerily, this echoes the words of Theodore Taylor, one of the chief designers of the first atom bomb in Los Alamos. He said, "The most stimulating factor of all was simply the intense exhilaration that every scientist or engineer experiences when he or she has the freedom to explore completely new technical concepts and bring them to reality."

Beyond malice or unbridled curiosity, the "militarization of biology" may also be a siren song for many scientists, physicians and their employers simply in need of a livelihood. Because prohibited actions derive from intent, the line between legitimate defensive activities and banned offensive weapons development may not be easily visible. Most agree that the development of vaccines against deadly diseases is a prudent biodefence measure, for example. But, what about the genetic modification of existing pathogens, in order to make them more deadly with a view to testing the limitations of these vaccines? How about testing these new pathogens on animals, or people, or producing them in quantity with a view to seeing how easy they would be for an adversary to weaponise? What happens if, in the process of testing scenarios against potential adversaries, a real military advantage is discovered – one that seems too good not to follow up further? Where is the line?

There is no doubt that the temptation already exists to bend or break long-established international taboos against poisoning and the deliberate spreading of disease, despite widespread public abhorrence. But if examined in its real context, the development of biological or chemical weapons, for whatever purpose, provides no long-term military advantage. All of this would serve to undermine the only sensible rule, which is the one that stands: no poisoning or deliberate spread of disease in war.

The ICRC appeal expresses grave concern about the growing potential for hostile use of the life sciences. It's by no means alone in these concerns. The Pugwash Movement of scientists and the British Medical Association are fully behind the ICRC's efforts, for example. Many life science professionals, medical associations and States have already lent their support, and more continue to unite behind the ICRC appeal's message.

Our shared concerns were heightened by the failure in 2001, after a decade or more of multilateral diplomatic efforts, to strengthen the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention by means of a compliance monitoring protocol. Moreover, five lives were lost and at least a dozen other people made gravely ill in anthrax attacks in the United States in late 2001. These attacks showed the massive fear and disruption that biological agents, when misused, can cause. The culprit or culprits, meanwhile, remain unidentified.

Yet even in the face of these dangers, much of the scientific community has remained oblivious. It's been asserted, for instance, that since science is intended to understand the laws of nature, it has no relation to politics. We often hear that "science cannot be blamed for its misapplication." This may have been true in the nineteenth century, when a scientific finding and its practical application were well separated in time. But since then there has been a remorseless narrowing of the gap between pure and applied science.

Nobel prize winner Joseph Rotblat observed that in many areas this distinction between pure and applied sciences has become very difficult to discern. Rotblat, like Theodore Taylor mentioned before, worked on the Manhattan project to develop the first nuclear weapon. Rotblat reflected that "what is pure research today may find an application tomorrow and become incorporated into the daily life of the citizen next week (or even earlier if it has military value). Scientists can no longer claim their work has nothing to do with the welfare of the individual or with state politics."

In September 2002, the ICRC launched its public appeal on "Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity". This appeal urged governments, the scientific and medical communities, industry and civil society to assume their share of the responsibility to prevent this risk of hostile use from assuming reality by taking a range of effective preventive measures.

Such measures should already be in place. However, contacts with biotechnology stakeholders in industry, academia and the scientific and medical communities shows a worryingly low level of awareness of the risks of hostile use or of the international agreements banning it. Many obtain their qualifications without any awareness that legal norms against poisoning and the deliberate spread of disease exist. It is clear that these target audiences need better knowledge of the risks, rules and their responsibilities to inform effective preventive measures.

The ICRC appeal calls on governments to reaffirm, implement and reinforce existing rules of international law banning the use of biological weapons. To this end, and to complement the efforts being made in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention, a ministerial level declaration by States is proposed. The ICRC has already begun discussing with States how such a declaration could be adopted, possibly in 2004.

Another essential step is adequate national legislation. Some States have still not enacted national measures necessary to implement the Biological Weapons Convention's prohibitions almost three decades after its entry into force.

The scientific and medical communities, as well as the pharmaceutical and biotech industries, must also contribute if an effective "web of prevention" is to be formed. This "web of prevention" requires three types of action:

1. To acknowledge that minimising the risks from the hostile use of advances related to the life sciences is of concern to them and part of their responsibility;

2. To identify and implement the necessary actions within their own sphere of influence that will contribute to risk reduction and that will complement action being taken in other spheres; and

3. To ensure their actions are known amongst and will complement the actions of others.

Key measures they could undertake include the development of codes of conduct, and effective regulation of research programmes, dangerous pathogens and other biological agents. Disease surveillance and response mechanisms, which are also crucial for public health, must be better resourced and improved. Knowledge of the taboos against hostile use must also be incorporated into scientific and medical education. It is, after all, the duty of the scientists, physicians and those who employ them to ensure that life is not put into peril through their work, but is made safe and its quality improved.

This brings me to my third and final point. If the appalling potential risks to humanity of the use of the life sciences for hostile purposes are to be averted, then you – the components of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement – must also help to achieve it by engaging your governments and national scientific and industrial organisations to understand and implement their responsibilities.

I urge States to respond positively to the ICRC's offer to help them facilitate a ministerial level declaration. It would clearly be in the international community's best interest to build political momentum toward effective preventive action both within and beyond the Biological Weapons Convention process, and in building a stock of political capital and good will to this end.

Significant credibility and momentum would be added to the ICRC appeal if National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies could promote the appeal at the national level with the types of key target audiences I've already mentioned. They could encourage their governments to participate in the ministerial declaration and work with them to enhance awareness and domestic implementation of international law concerning poison and the deliberate spread of disease. They could build knowledge of the norms into their outreach and education activities. Some have already begun such cooperation. The Canadian and Norwegian Red Cross Societies, for instance, convened yesterday's workshop on "Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity" in partnership with their respective governments.

It has been said that "Technology has two faces: one that is full of promise, and one that can discourage and defeat us. . . more power and more choice and more freedom require more wisdom if they are to add up to more humanity. But, surely that is a challenge to be wise, not an invitation to despair."

This holds an important lesson for us. In today's world there is an increasingly pervasive danger that poison or infectious disease could be used for warfare, or for terror. The International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement as whole therefore needs to send a firm message that taboos against poison and the deliberate spread of disease remain crucial in the 21st century, and must be strengthened. This includes promoting universal individual awareness in the life sciences of the risks of hostile use, and the need for appropriate vigilance and practical preventive action. With more knowledge comes more responsibility.