Note : The present report doesn't necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC.
Precis
The workshop presented the risks posed by the dramatic advances being made every day in the life sciences, and identified steps that could be taken to prevent their use for hostile purposes, including greater awareness and support for the ICRC initiative on biotechnology, weapons and humanity (BWH). It also discussed the need to establish effective controls and national implementation measures in order to ensure that weapons were in conformity with international humanitarian law (IHL).
Report
The first speaker, Professor Malcolm Dando (Bradford University), outlined the risks posed by the potential hostile use of advances in the life sciences, despite such use being banned by international law. History was replete with incidents where poisons had been used and disease deliberately spread. Since the 19th century, scientific progress had been accompanied in some States by offensive biological weapons programmes. The life sciences were yielding a variety of applications of great potential benefit to humanity, but those applications could also be used for hostile purposes: to kill, for criminal ends and even as weapons of mass destruction. What had changed recently was that the pace of technological progress associated with the life sciences was accelerating, and the list of benign avenues of research that could be misused lengthening as a result of developments in a number of inter-related technological fields.
Professor Dando noted that 'traditional' biological warfare agents such as anthrax, smallpox and plague still constituted the main threat. Clandestine offensive State programmes were still being run. But knowledge that could be turned to hostile use was rapidly escaping government control. He supported the ICRC appeal as it was essential to develop a 'web of prevention' before new advances in biotechnology became too easily accessible to control effectively. Several recent worrisome developments included a mouse pox altered to be more lethal (other diseases might also be altered), a poliovirus that had been synthetically developed using a recipe found on the Internet and mail order materials, and genetically engineered anthrax. The risk was not confined to microbes. Greater understanding of basic life processes and the ability to manipulate them could result in weapons that targeted the nervous system or brain functions.
The second speaker, Mr Peter Herby (ICRC), agreed that new developments were changing the risk equation associated with the potential use of the life sciences for hostile purposes. The ICRC was engaging governments in order to raise awareness of the risks, rules and responsibilities in this field, including by proposing a ministerial level declaration. Scientists, physicians and those employing them had a special responsibility to ensure that hostile use was prevented. That responsibility arose in part from international legal rules, including the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention. In the life sciences community, however, current levels of awareness about the risks, rules and responsibilities were worryingly low.
Mr Herby raised the ICRC's concept of a 'web of prevention', which calls on those conducting research in the life sciences to: (a) acknowledge their responsibilities; (b) implement practical measures with a view to minimizing risk; and (c) ensure that their actions complement those of others. Examples of specific measures included enhanced implementation of existing legal norms, disease surveillance to facilitate prompt detection, the promotion and dissemination of IHL norms within the life science community, and professional codes of conduct. The Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement had a role to play, especially in view of Council of Delegates Resolution 4 encouraging the Movement’s components to promote the BWH initiative with national authorities, the scientific and medical communities, industry and civil society.
Mr Robert Lawson (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada) focused on a complementary element of the Agenda for Humanitarian Action, namely the goal of ensuring the legality of new weapons under international law in accordance with Article 36 of 1977 Protocol I additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. He reported briefly on the outcome of a round table of governmental and independent experts co-hosted by the Canadian Government and the Canadian Red Cross Society in March 2003 on Article 36. Canada's armed forces had worked at the vanguard to enhance and formalize the processes called for under Article 36. This provided the context for Canada's pledge at the 28th International Conference concerning implementation of Article 36.
Discussion
Many National Society participants confirmed the importance both of the BWH initiative and of Article 36 weapons reviews in their remarks. One participant spoke of the SARS outbreak in Canada and the pressure it had put on the public health authorities and auxiliary Red Cross services. Cases of deliberate poisoning or infection could be much worse. "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." Effective prevention of hostile use would require a great deal of work with non-governmental entities in the life sciences, an opportunity the Movement should seize, particularly with youth. In addition, the Movement had a definite responsibility to promote and disseminate international humanitarian law to that end.
Several participants stated their support for the ICRC appeal and its follow-on activities, including a ministerial level declaration. The panel was asked if preventive measures, particularly multilateral compliance regimes to ensure confidence in compliance with norms against hostile use, could keep pace with developments in the life sciences. The panel's response was that such regimes should not be viewed as impossible to circumvent: it was unrealistic to expect that every violator would be detected or deterred. Like the draft protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention rejected in mid-2001, however, such regimes would be a great step forward and would help to consolidate existing norms.
The panel noted that countries with advanced capabilities in the life sciences needed to resist the temptation to weaponize biology, or to blur the edges of existing prohibitions because this would carve out routes for others to follow later. This, it was observed, was what had happened with many weapon systems developed by advanced military powers during the Cold War, such as the rocket-propelled grenade launchers now used in many internal conflicts around the world.
This prompted discussion of the relative resources of rich and poor nations to combat disease in general. The participants were left to ponder what percentage of their extremely limited public health resources poor countries should allocate to preparations for deliberate outbreaks of disease as opposed to dealing with pressing needs such as AIDs. There was agreement that governments and local authorities needed to work together from the start, in a transparent way, the better to prevent natural or deliberate outbreaks of disease. Hungary's pledge to create and strengthen national and international disease-response capacities was noted. Several participants said that international organizations and the Movement could play a very useful role in developing 'networked preparedness'.
The participants also discussed the respective roles of governments, National Red Cross Societies and the ICRC in respect of Article 36 weapons reviews. The Movement could play a useful role, especially in ensuring that legal norms were adequately implemented and the implications of new weapons thought through by governments against the benchmark of international legal principles in the context of their weapons review mechanisms.
